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ABSTRACT
Using the July 2016 federal appellate court decision in Detroit Free
Press, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice as an analytical springboard, this
article explores the expansion of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Ex-
emption 7(C) in the Internet era. In Detroit Free Press, the Sixth Circuit
recognized a privacy interest in mug shots under Exemption 7(C). The
practical impact of the decision is to uphold the general policy of the U.S.
Marshals Service not to release mug shots. This article illustrates the yawn-
ing gap between tort law, which this article argues would deny recovery for
the Internet posting of the mug shots at issue in Detroit Free Press, and
Exemption 7(C) when it comes to privacy concerns. Furthermore, this arti-
cle critiques three key reasons why the Sixth Circuit in 2016 reversed its
ruling from twenty years ago in which it held there was no privacy interest
in mug shots. Troublingly for access advocates, courts are justifying expan-
sion of the meaning of “personal privacy” within Exemption 7(C) as a
mechanism for counteracting the ease and permanence of accessibility to
information on the Internet.
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INTRODUCTION
WHEN former Stanford University swimmer Brock Turner wassentenced in June 2016 to six months in jail for sexual assault, itsparked outrage.1 The paltry punishment, however, was not
the only aspect of Turner’s case causing considerable consternation.
In particular, the delayed release of his booking photo—more com-
monly, a mug shot2—”became an issue in the debate over how the story
of the sexual assault he committed was told.”3 Due to belated access to
Turner’s mug shot, news outlets instead published “yearbook-style smil-
ing photographs of him with a tie and jacket.”4
To critics, this seemed like “preferential treatment symptomatic of a
culture of white male privilege.”5 As Fred Ritchin, Dean of New York
City’s International Center of Photography School, explained in Time,
“[m]any wanted to have had a mug shot released that demonstrated that
a white student from an elite university held on sexual assault charges
would be treated, at the very least, like everyone else.”6 NBC News re-
ported that “[t]he resentment sparked a very active hashtag on Twitter
and Instagram: #NoMugShot.”7
Those upset by the protracted battle over Turner’s mug shot, which was
held by two Northern California law enforcement agencies,8 surely would
be stunned to discover that it is even harder to obtain a mug shot held by
a federal agency—in particular, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).9 In-
1. Liam Stack, Outrage Over Sentencing in Rape Case at Stanford, N.Y. Times, June
7, 2016, at A15; see Jennifer Calfas, Stanford Student in Assault Case Freed, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 3, 2016, at A3 (reporting that Turner was released after serving three months of his
six-month sentence and noting that his “sentence drew national outrage and launched an
effort to unseat the judge who imposed it”).
2. See State v. Haynes, 6 P.3d 1026, 1029 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that a
booking photo is “more colloquially” known as “a mugshot”).
3. Elahe Izadi & Abby Ohlheiser, Why You Are Only Now Seeing the Stanford Sex
Offender’s Mugshot, Wash. Post (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2016/06/06/where-is-stanford-sex-offender-brock-turners-mugshot-here
[https://perma.cc/P5NY-9KBR].
4. Fred Ritchin, The Ambiguous Role of Photography in Presenting Innocence and




7. Alex Johnson, After Months of Requests, Mugshots of Stanford Rapist Brock Tur-
ner Finally Emerge, NBC News (June 7, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/af-
ter-months-requests-mugshots-stanford-rapist-brock-turner-finally-emerge-n586936
[https://perma.cc/PSS5-FLBB].
8. Turner was arrested and booked by the Stanford Department of Public Safety but
later was turned over to the Santa Clara Sheriff’s Department. Dayna Evans, Brock Turner
Mug Shot Finally Released [Updated], N.Y. Mag.: THE CUT (June 6, 2016, 4:12 PM), http://
nymag.com/thecut/2016/06/no-brock-turner-mug-shot.html [https://perma.cc/4DYV-X54N].
The two agencies “seemed to be volleying the responsibility for releasing the mug shot
back and forth.” Id.
9. When it comes to accessing mug shots in California, where Brock Turner was ar-
rested and convicted, “there is no California case that discusses whether the Public
Records Act requires release of booking photographs, or whether such records are ex-
2017] Reining in Internet 257
deed, on the fiftieth anniversary of the federal Freedom of Information
Act10 (FOIA) in 2016,11 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
dealt a blow to journalists, news consumers, and access advocates in De-
troit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice12 (hereinafter Detroit
Free Press II).
There, the appellate court held, in a sharply divided nine-to-seven en
banc ruling, that FOIA Exemption 7(C)13 protects a defendant’s14 “non-
trivial privacy interest in booking photos.”15 The Sixth Circuit, in turn,
concluded that the statutory privacy interest in mug shots requires courts
to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether that privacy interest is out-
weighed by “the public’s interest in disclosure”16 before such images can
be publicly released after an FOIA request. It remanded the case to the
district court to make that determination.17
If releasing Brock Turner’s mug shot was important because people
wanted to see that he—stereotyped as a privileged white male18—“would
be treated, at the very least, like everyone else,”19 then the same ratio-
nale for disclosure certainly holds true for the individuals depicted in the
mug shots at the heart of Detroit Free Press II. Those images are of four
police officers charged “with bribery and drug conspiracy.”20 Seeing their
mug shots helps to ensure the public that police officers are treated like
empt.” A&A: Trouble Obtaining Arrest Records, First Amendment Coalition (Oct. 28,
2011), https://firstamendmentcoalition.org/2011/10/aatrouble-obtaining-arrest-records-and-
mugshots [https://perma.cc/HG8W-MBZY]. A 2003 opinion issued by Bill Lockyer, then
California’s Attorney General, provides that:
A sheriff has discretion to furnish copies of photographs of arrested persons,
commonly known as “mug shots,” in response to a request from a member of
the general public, including the news media; however, once a copy is fur-
nished to one member of the general public, a copy must be made available
to all who make a request.
Op. of Lockyer, No. 03-205, 86 Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 152, 152 (2003), 2003 WL 21672840.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
11. See Erin C. Carroll, Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information
Act to Preference the Press, 2016 Utah L. Rev. 193, 207 (2016) (observing that, in the year
the article was published, “FOIA celebrates its fiftieth anniversary,” and noting that “[i]n
1966, when it was passed, FOIA was groundbreaking”).
12. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3246 (May 22, 2017).
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012) (exempting from disclosure “records or infor-
mation compiled for law enforcement purposes” that “could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”).
14. See Detroit Free Press II, 829 F.3d at 485 (“The privacy interest in a booking photo
is the defendant’s”).
15. Id. at 482.
16. Id. at 484.
17. Id. at 485.
18. See Naeemah Clark, Why Brock Turner Should Talk to Campus Men About Sexual
Assault, Chron. Higher Educ. (June 9, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Why-Brock-
Turner-Should-Talk/236747 [https://perma.cc/XZ8R-ENKR] (“White privilege, a societal
phenomenon where the majority benefits simply by being in the majority, means the white
men on campus have been born with systemic advantages that give them access to opportu-
nities that I, as an African-American woman, cannot fathom.”).
19. Ritchin, supra note 4.
20. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 16 F. Supp. 3d 798, 806 (E.D.
Mich. 2014), rev’d, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016).
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everyone else entering the criminal justice system, rather than being han-
dled with kid gloves. The officers’ privacy interests, in turn, are non-exis-
tent, as the Department of Justice (DOJ) publicly revealed their names in
a press release trumpeting their arrests—a document still readily availa-
ble on the DOJ’s website.21
Photographs, of course, are essential in journalism storytelling, helping
not just to pull readers into an article but also to enhance factual recall.22
Indeed, communication scholars assert that mug shots are “an important
element of newspaper content.”23 In fact, mug shots have “a long tradi-
tion in newspaper photojournalism,”24 serving a key—if somewhat primi-
tive—function because readers desire to see what people in the news look
like.25 Furthermore, mug shots provide an “intertextual link”26 that sug-
gests a person’s state of mind by his or her appearance. Additionally,
publishing mug shots promotes desirable social norms. As scholars Mark
Grabowski and Sokthan Yeng argue, “[i]f posting a mug shot of an al-
leged drunk driver helps to enforce the idea that drunk driving is bad, this
would help create a positive norm or standard of behavior.”27
The July 2016 ruling in Detroit Free Press II, however, brings the Sixth
Circuit in line with decisions during the prior five years by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in World Publishing Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice28 and the Elev-
enth Circuit in Karantsalis v. U.S. Department of Justice.29 Those
appellate courts also recognized a defendant’s privacy interest in booking
photos protected by Exemption 7(C).30 Detroit Free Press II means, in
21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Four Highland Park Police Officers Arrested
and Charged With Taking Bribes and Conspiring to Protect and Deliver Six Kilograms of
Cocaine (Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Arrest Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/usao-
edmi/pr/four-highland-park-police-officers-arrested-and-charged-taking-bribes-and-con-
spiring [https://perma.cc/H9L6-WD4T].
22. Laurence B. Lain & Philip J. Harwood, Mug Shots and Reader Attitudes Toward
People in the News, 69 Journalism Q. 293, 294 (1992).
23. Id.
24. Paul Martin Lester, Front Page Mug Shots: A Content Analysis of Five U.S. News-
papers in 1986, 9 Newspaper Res. J. 1, 1 (1988).
25. Id.
26. John H. Coverdale et al., “Behind the Gun Shot Grin”: Uses of Madness-Talk in
Reports of Loughner’s Mass Killing, 37 J. Comm. Inquiry 200, 208 (2013).
27. Mark Grabowski & Sokthan Yeng, To Post or Not to Post: Philosophical and Ethi-
cal Considerations for Mug Shot Websites, in Digital Ethics: Research & Practice 99, 113
(Don Heider & Adrienne L. Massanari eds., 2012).
28. World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825 (10th Cir. 2012).
29. Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 635 F.3d 497 (11th Cir. 2011).
30. The Tenth Circuit in World Publishing Co. found that “[p]ersons arrested on fed-
eral charges outside of the Sixth Circuit maintain some expectation of privacy in their
booking photos.” World Publ’g Co., 672 F.3d at 829.
The prior year, the Eleventh Circuit in Karantsalis issued a one-paragraph per curiam opin-
ion affirming a district court ruling recognizing such a privacy interest. Karantsalis, 635
F.3d at 499. Specifically, U.S. District Judge Paul Huck found that booking photos impli-
cate a “personal privacy interest.” Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09-CV-22910
2009, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126576, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2009), aff’d, 635 F.3d 497 (11th
Cir. 2011). In reaching this pro-privacy conclusion, Huck wrote that he agreed:
with the Marshals Service that a booking photograph is a unique and power-
ful type of photograph that raises personal privacy interests distinct from
normal photographs. A booking photograph is a vivid symbol of criminal
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turn, that a conflict or split of authority among the federal appellate cir-
cuits31 no longer exists regarding privacy in mug shots under FOIA. This,
unfortunately for free press advocates, reduces the odds of the U.S. Su-
preme Court reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s decision.32 Indeed, in May 2017
the Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in the case.
The practical impact of Detroit Free Press II is to uphold the USMS’s
policy not “to honor FOIA requests for booking photos.”33 That decree,
set forth in a 2012 DOJ memorandum, provides that:
the USMS will not disclose booking photographs under the FOIA,
regardless of where the FOIA request originated, unless USMS
OGC [Office of General Counsel] determines either that the re-
quester has made the requisite showing that the public interest in the
requested booking photograph outweighs the privacy interest at
stake or that other factors specific to the particular FOIA request
warrant processing that request consistent with existing Sixth Circuit
precedent.34
The emphasized portion of that policy, which today is irrelevant after
Detroit Free Press II, references the now-overruled 1996 Sixth Circuit de-
cision in Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice35 (hereinaf-
ter Detroit Free Press I). There, the Sixth Circuit declared that releasing
mug shots of federally indicted defendants, whose names were already
accusation, which, when released to the public, intimates, and is often
equated with, guilt. Further, a booking photograph captures the subject in
the vulnerable and embarrassing moments immediately after being accused,
taken into custody, and deprived of most liberties.
Id. at *11–12.
31. See Karen M. Gebbia, Circuit Splits and Empiricism in the Supreme Court, 36 Pace
L. Rev. 477, 504 (2016) (“The Supreme Court typically reviews federal circuit court of
appeals’ decisions on certiorari to resolve either a split among the lower federal courts, an
important question of federal law, or a constitutional or quasi-constitutional question.”)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added); Heather Meeker, Stalking the Golden Topic: A
Guide to Locating and Selecting Topics for Legal Research Papers, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 917,
925 (1996) (“One of the explicit grounds for granting certiorari in the United States Su-
preme Court is to resolve conflicts between the circuit courts of appeals.”).
32. Shortly after the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Detroit Free Press II, the news-
paper’s attorney, Herschel Fink, said the paper was considering asking the Supreme Court
to hear the case. Sophie Murguia, Sixth Circuit Limits Access to Federal Mug Shots, Re-
porters Committee for Freedom of the Press (July 15, 2016), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-
media-law-resources/news/sixth-circuit-limits-access-federal-mug-shots [https://perma.cc/
5HST-SB4V].
In November 2016, the newspaper filed its petition for a writ of certiorari with the Su-
preme Court. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-706). The brief is available at http://www
.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/16-706-cert-amicus-ReportersCommittee.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BBS-ESPG]. The Court denied the petition in May 2017. Detroit Free
Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3246 (May 22, 2017).
33. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2016).
34. Memorandum to All United States Marshals et al., Office of the General Counsel,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 12, 2012), at 2–3 [hereinafter Marshals Memorandum], https://
www.usmarshals.gov/foia/policy/booking_photos.pdf [https://perma.cc/27VF-QPX4] (em-
phasis added).
35. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93 (6th Cir. 1996), over-
ruled by Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016).
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public and who had previously appeared in open court, “could not rea-
sonably be expected to constitute an invasion of personal privacy.”36
The question thus is: Why did the Sixth Circuit in 2016 reverse its rul-
ing from two decades earlier, thereby changing its interpretation of a fed-
eral statute and conflicting with the principle of stare decisis?37 After all,
as the U.S. Supreme Court observed, “[s]tare decisis is the preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”38
The answer is that, in addition to considering rulings by other circuits in
World Publishing Co. and Karantsalis, which recognized a privacy inter-
est in booking photos, three factors were critical to the majority’s change
of heart in Detroit Free Press II. Those variables are:
(1) The Internet—specifically, proliferation of mug shot-oriented web-
sites that allow booking photos to be accessed both in perpetuity and with
minimal effort, time, and expense;39
(2) Public Ignorance—in particular, alleged misperception by some in-
dividuals who see booking photos and wrongly believe the people de-
picted therein already have been adjudicated guilty;40 and
(3) Embarrassment—specifically, that booking photos constitute “em-
barrassing and humiliating information”41 regarding the individuals they
depict.
This article critiques this trio of variables, including some implicit judi-
cial assumptions lurking beneath them that played a pivotal role in De-
troit Free Press II. In the process, the article argues that traditional tort
principles—namely, those pertaining to causes of action for public disclo-
sure of private facts and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED)—would likely prevent a person from recovering damages under
those theories based upon the Internet-posting of his or her booking pho-
tograph. In other words, there is a gaping disconnect between FOIA Ex-
emption 7(C) that, per Detroit Free Press II, stops the dissemination of
booking photos in the name of privacy, and tort principles that generally
would allow the dissemination of booking photos and leave remediless
those depicted therein.
36. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
37. See Richard M. Garner, Flexible Predictability: Stare Decisis in Ohio, 48 Akron L.
Rev. 15, 15 (2015) (observing that the doctrine of stare decisis “holds that similar cases
should be decided by similar legal principles rather than by the personal views of an ever-
changing judiciary”); Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s
Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 Ala. L.
Rev. 789, 811 (2002) (noting that “for opinions involving statutory interpretation, the
Court employs a presumption against the overruling of precedent, as an essential feature of
its stare decisis doctrine”).
38. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
39. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 482–83 (6th Cir.
2016).
40. Id. at 482.
41. Id.
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Additionally, this article contends that the Detroit Free Press II major-
ity’s concern with mug-shot websites is better addressed through legisla-
tion directly targeting those sites rather than by a judicial decision. In
particular, Detroit Free Press II amounts to a preemptive strike against all
mug shot publicity and hinders everyone—including mainstream journal-
ists and news organizations—from easily obtaining those images based on
the fear that they later will be exploited downstream by a few businesses.
Furthermore, this article asserts that public misunderstanding about the
nature of booking photos—the supposed misperception that individuals
depicted therein are guilty—does not justify judicial intervention target-
ing public access to them. To paraphrase a well-worn cliche´, public igno-
rance of the law is no excuse for restricting access to truthful
information;42 the remedy, if anything, is education—not censorship in
the name of privacy.
Ultimately, this article concludes that the majority erred in Detroit Free
Press II. Tort principles from public disclosure and IIED can serve as
useful heuristics in future cases, both for identifying privacy interests
under Exemption 7(C) and for determining when, per that exemption, a
disclosure causes an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”43
Detroit Free Press II, however, opens the door for using Exemption
7(C) as a tool promoting FOIA’s version of the “right to be forgot-
ten”44—or, perhaps more accurately, for expanding the “practical obscu-
rity” rationale for rap sheets embraced in U.S. Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.45 The premise for opening
this door rests on little more than shielding a person from the kind of
embarrassment and humiliation spawned by a single, accurate (and often
newsworthy) image that is non-compensable in tort law. Put slightly dif-
ferently, non-disclosure of mug shots under Exemption 7(C) serves the
same purpose as the right to be forgotten but does so by impeding—at
the outset—their public dissemination in order to shield a person from
potential embarrassment wrought by truthful information in the future.
Part I of the article reviews Exemption 7(C).46 It also discusses the
Supreme Court’s 1989 ruling in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,47 which affects the scope of this ex-
emption, and the Court’s clear concern fifteen years later with the nexus
between privacy and the Internet in National Archives and Records Ad-
42. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The familiar maxim
‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ typically holds true.”)
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012).
44. See generally Patricia Sa´nchez Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Right to be For-
gotten: Who Decides What the World Forgets?, 103 Ky. L.J. 363 (2015) (providing an excel-
lent overview of the right to be forgotten concept, stretching from its history through the
ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espa-
n˜ola de Proteccio´n de Datos).
45. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
762 (1989).
46. See Part I, infra notes 54–154 and accompanying text.
47. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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ministration v. Favish.48 Additionally, Part I touches briefly and more
generally on other opinions addressing the connection between privacy
and the Internet when it comes to releasing images.
Next, Part II provides a primer on the elements of the torts of public
disclosure of private facts and IIED.49 It also argues that neither theory
would allow the individuals depicted in their mug shots at issue in Detroit
Free Press II to recover damages for their publication.
With background from Parts I and II in mind, the article shifts in Part
III to critiquing the three factors identified above50 from the majority’s
ruling in Detroit Free Press II that purportedly favor a privacy interest in
booking photos.51 In the process, Part III also examines the dissent’s logic
in Detroit Free Press II as it relates to these three variables. Finally, Part
IV concludes that Detroit Free Press II was wrongly decided, and it avers
that courts in the future would benefit from considering tort law princi-
ples in Exemption 7(C) analyses in which proposed privacy interests are
at stake alongside the public’s unenumerated First Amendment52 right to
know.53
I. FOIA EXEMPTION 7(C): ITS MEANING AND EXPANSION
IN THE INTERNET AGE
The federal Freedom of Information Act, Professor Martin Halstuk ob-
serves, was passed by Congress in “1966 to make public the activities and
processes of the federal government’s approximately one hundred federal
agencies and departments.”54 Although signed into law by “a reluctant
President Lyndon Johnson”55 and exempting from its reach records held
by “Congress, the courts, and the president,”56 FOIA nonetheless was, as
professor and MacArthur Fellow Michael Schudson recently wrote, “a
landmark development of a more open society.”57
FOIA applies to government agency58 records.59 The Supreme Court
emphasized forty years ago that “disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant
48. 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
49. See Part II, infra notes 155–217 and accompanying text.
50. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 482–83 (6th Cir.
2016).
51. See Part III, infra notes 218–268 and accompanying text.
52. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than
ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental
liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
53. See Part IV, infra notes 269–282 and accompanying text.
54. Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the Open Govern-
ment Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 CommLaw Conspectus 427, 429 (2008).
55. Michael Schudson, The Rise of the Right to Know 34 (2015).
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id. at 30.
58. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2012) (defining the term “agency”).
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2) (2012) (defining the term “record”).
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objective”60 of FOIA. There are, however, nine exemptions carved out by
the FOIA statute that may apply when a person requests a record.61
These exemptions, Professor Mark Grunewald writes, remove a “record
from the mandatory disclosure requirement.”62
Critical for this article is Exemption 7(C). It shields from disclosure
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” by a
government agency that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” were they to be released.63
The applicability of the exemption thus involves a two-part determina-
tion, with both parts required to prevent disclosure: (1) the record in
question was compiled for law enforcement purposes, and (2) its release
might reasonably amount to an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy.64 It is the meaning of the second part of this test that is contested in
Detroit Free Press II, as the parties agreed that the booking photos at
issue of four Michigan police officers charged with bribery and drug con-
spiracy65 were compiled for law enforcement purposes.66 How, then, does
this analysis proceed?
Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear in 2011 in Federal Com-
munications Commission v. AT&T, Inc. that only humans, not corpora-
tions, can assert a privacy interest under Exemption 7(C).67 There, AT&T
claimed a personal privacy interest in certain documents it submitted to
the Federal Communications Commission’s Enforcement Bureau as part
of an investigation into whether the phone company overcharged the
government for services it provided to the government’s education-rate
program.68 In rejecting AT&T’s contention, Chief Justice John Roberts
wrote for a unanimous Court that “[t]he protection in FOIA against dis-
closure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to
corporations.”69
60. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
61. See Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 Am. U. L. Rev.
217, 222 (2011) (“This statute gives anyone the right to request federal agency records and
requires agencies to release them unless they fall within one of the nine exempt categories.”)
(emphasis added).
62. Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information and Confidentiality Under the Ad-
ministrative Dispute Resolution Act, 9 Admin. L.J. 985, 994 (1996).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012).
64. Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966-
2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection Over the Public Interest in Knowing
What The Government’s Up to, 11 Comm. L. & Pol’y 511, 541 (2006); see Jeffrey R. Boles,
Documenting Death: Public Access to Government Death Records and Attendant Privacy
Concerns, 22 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 237, 250–51 (2012) (observing that “[w]hen faced
with an Exemption 7(C) withholding dispute, courts first decide whether the information
or records withheld were in fact ‘compiled for law enforcement purposes,’” and that if this
requirement is satisfied, then courts “employ a balancing test . . . which weighs the privacy
right against the public’s right to be informed”).
65. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2016).
66. See id. (“Neither party disputes that booking photos meet the first requirement.”).
67. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409–10 (2011).
68. Id. at 400.
69. Id. at 409–410.
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Sections A and B below describe two Supreme Court opinions that are
crucial for better understanding the meaning of Exemption 7(C)’s phrase
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.”70
A. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS71
In Reporters Committee, the Court held that criminal identification
records—better known as rap sheets72—possessed by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) are, “as a categorical matter,” immune from disclo-
sure under Exemption 7(C) as an unwarranted invasion of the personal
privacy of the individuals to whom they pertain.73 In reaching this pro-
secrecy conclusion, the Court, in an opinion by John Paul Stevens, fo-
cused on two significant points.
The first is the nature of an FBI rap sheet as “compiled computerized
information”74 and an aggregate summary “of otherwise hard-to-obtain
information”75 scattered in “courthouse files, county archives, and local
police stations throughout the country.”76 In brief, a rap sheet makes
available, “in a single clearinghouse of information,” multiple data points
that otherwise are difficult to track down and collate and thus, were it not
for a rap sheet, would likely linger and languish in what the Court called
“practical obscurity.”77 As Professors Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic
Stutzman encapsulate, “[t]he information was considered practically ob-
scure because of the extremely high cost and low likelihood of the infor-
mation being compiled by the public.”78
Thus, a key part of Justice Stevens’ opinion pivoted on what he called
“the basic difference between scattered bits of criminal history and a fed-
eral compilation.”79 The decision in Reporters Committee therefore
turned, in part, “on the nature of the requested document.”80
The second point Stevens emphasized is the supposed central purpose
of record disclosure under FOIA. He wrote that FOIA “focuses on the
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012).
71. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989).
72. Id. at 751.
73. Id. at 780; see Jane Kirtley, “Misguided in Principle and Unworkable in Practice”: It
Is Time to Discard the Reporters Committee Doctrine of Practical Obscurity (and its Evil
Twin, the Right to be Forgotten), 20 Comm. L. & Pol’y 91, 94 (2015) (observing that the
Court concluded rap sheets are “categorically exempt from disclosure because their release
would invariably constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy”).
74. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 766.
75. Id. at 764.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 780.
78. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 Calif.
L. Rev. 1, 21 (2013).
79. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767.
80. Id. at 772.
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citizens’ right to be informed about ‘what their government is up to.’”81
Critically, however, the Court added that this purpose “is not fostered by
disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in va-
rious governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an
agency’s own conduct.”82 As Professor Benjamin Cramer sums up the
constricting impact of this holding, “the only public interest in disclosing
private information is to inform citizens about the workings of
government.”83
In other words, the Reporters Committee Court drew a dichotomy be-
tween, on the one hand, requests made to learn about a private citizen
and, on the other hand, requests made to learn about the conduct of a
government agency. As Stevens wrote, “FOIA’s central purpose is to en-
sure that the Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public
scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in
the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.”84
This distinction regarding FOIA’s purpose proved pivotal in finding
that Exemption 7(C) shielded from disclosure the FBI rap sheet of
Charles Medico, a member of an alleged organized crime syndicate
known as the Medico Family.85 Justice Stevens explained that:
[i]n this case—and presumably in the typical case in which one pri-
vate citizen is seeking information about another—the requester
does not intend to discover anything about the conduct of the agency
that has possession of the requested records. Indeed, response to this
request would not shed any light on the conduct of any Government
agency or official.86
The Reporters Committee decision is criticized on grounds related both
to the Court’s central-purpose logic and its focus on the nature of rap
sheets/practical obscurity. For instance, Professor Martin Halstuk and
Dean Charles Davis assert that the Court’s articulation of FOIA’s central
purpose—learning about the conduct of government agencies—”sharply
limited the ambit of information that can be released.”87 Blasting this
interpretation of FOIA’s central purpose as “an alarming instance of ju-
dicial activism,”88 they contend that it “raises serious questions about the
future of public access to vast stores of government-held information that
does not necessarily reveal government operations but that still holds
81. Id. at 773.
82. Id.
83. Benjamin W. Cramer, Privacy Exceptionalism and Confidentiality Versus the Pub-
lic Interest in Uncovering Universal Service Fraud, 20 Comm. L. & Pol’y 149, 181 (2015).
84. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774 (emphasis in original).
85. See id. at 757 (noting that the FBI released the rap sheets of three other members
of the Medico family after their deaths in response to “requests made by a CBS news
correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press”).
86. Id. at 773.
87. Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest be Damned: Lower
Court Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose” Reformulation, 54 Admin.
L. Rev. 983, 987 (2002).
88. Id. at 995.
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great public interest.”89 The duo demonstrate that the legislative intent
behind access under FOIA was, in fact, far broader90 than Reporters
Committee’s narrow focus on accessing only “official information that re-
flects an agency’s performance and conduct.”91
The practical impact of the decision, in turn, is to force FOIA record
requesters to demonstrate, when a government agency claims an exemp-
tion, that their need for a record fits within the slender scope of this cen-
tral-purpose formulation—a hurdle that Professor Cramer notes “can be
excessively difficult for the requester,”92 and one that Professor Halstuk
and Dean Davis point out did not exist before Reporters Committee.93 As
Halstuk and Davis observe, “[p]re-Reporters Committee courts routinely
held that the FOIA can be used for any private or public purpose, with-
out the need for a requester be required to justify a request.”94
Indeed, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stresses both that “[t]he Report-
ers Committee ‘core purpose’ limitation is not found in FOIA’s lan-
guage”95 and that “no such limitation appears in the text of any FOIA
exemption.”96 Yet by adding the core-purpose requirement, Reporters
Committee “changed the FOIA calculus.”97
Professor Jane Kirtley, who was the Executive Director of the Report-
ers Committee for Freedom of the Press when the Court issued its deci-
sion,98 notes that when the Electronic Freedom of Information Act was
adopted in 1996, Congress clarified “that the public has a right to access
agency records ‘for any public or private purpose.’”99 This language, Kir-
tley asserts from her current perch as Silha Professor of Media Ethics and
Law at the University of Minnesota, reinforces the broad idea—one con-
tradicting Reporters Committee—”that important interests are also served
when members of the public are allowed to tap into the vast storehouses
of information collected by government employees at taxpayers’ expense,
regardless of whether they reveal details about how the government
functions.”100
Criticizing the Court’s other focus in Reporters Committee—namely,
the collated nature of rap sheets—Halstuk and Davis aver “that nowhere
89. Id. at 990.
90. Id. at 991.
91. Id.
92. Cramer, supra note 83, at 183.
93. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 87, at 992.
94. Id. at 1021.
95. U.S. Dep’t of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 507 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 508.
97. Id. at 505.
98. See Kirtley, supra note 73, at 92 (“In the interest of full disclosure, I must note that
I was the Executive Director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press for
fourteen years, and it was on my watch that we argued, and lost, this case. I regard it as the
proverbial albatross around my neck.”).
99. Id. at 95 (quoting the findings section of the Electronic Freedom of Information
Act, Pub. L. 104-231, § 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3048–49 (1996)).
100. Id.
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in the FOIA is there any mention that the form or format of a record
should be considered when an agency determines whether to disclose re-
quested information.”101 Similarly, Kirtley contends that the aggregated
format of rap sheets should make no difference because:
the fundamental nature of the records remains the same: They are
public documents, reflecting an individual’s involvement with the
criminal justice system. If the records are public—and presumptively
a matter of public interest—at their source, that interest does not
fade away simply because the records have been consolidated in one
place.102
Kirtley adds that “by disclosing details about individuals who have had
a brush with the criminal justice system, these records provide insights
into how government functions.”103
Kirtley’s sentiment here is important because it concisely makes the
case why mug shots should be disclosed in cases like Detroit Free Press II.
Mug shots, for example, might reveal the skin color—perhaps indicating
race or ethnicity—of those targeted for arrest, thereby shining a spotlight
on allegations of racial or ethnic profiling. They may also shed light on
the apparent physical condition of an individual—perhaps a face blood-
ied and bruised during the police apprehension process.104 As attorney
Adam Marshall of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
explains, “[a]ccess to mug shots could help the public understand if there
was potential abuse of someone when they were arrested . . . If they have
cuts on their face or a black eye, that would allow the public to say, ‘Hey,
what happened here?’”105 Ultimately, if the U.S. Supreme Court in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia106 was correct that “the appearance of
justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it,”107 then
mug shots should be disclosed under FOIA because they provide a
chance to observe a person’s entry into the criminal justice system.
Importantly, Detroit Free Press II is readily distinguished from Report-
ers Committee by the simple fact that a mug shot lacks the collated, aggre-
gate nature of a rap sheet. While the Court in Reporters Committee
101. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 87, at 994.
102. Kirtley, supra note 73, at 94.
103. Id.
104. See Gregory Nathaniel Wolfe, Note, Smile for the Camera, The World Is Going to
See That Mug: The Dilemma of Privacy Interests in Mug Shots, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2227,
2242 (2013) (noting that journalists “purport to use mug shots to monitor government mis-
conduct, including police mistreatment of arrestees”).
105. Jessica Priest, Victoria Sheriff Stops Releasing Jail Mug Shots, Victoria Advocate
(Tex.), Aug. 14, 2016, https://www.victoriaadvocate.com/news/2016/aug/13/victoria-sheriff-
stops-releasing-jail-mug-shots/ [https://perma.cc/7SPY-6HTB].
106. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond News-
papers, the Court found “that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
criminal trial under our system of justice.” Id. at 573. The Court added that when it comes
to criminal trials, “the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open
to the public at the time that Amendment was adopted.” Id. at 576.
107. Id. at 572.
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focused on “the power of compilations to affect personal privacy,”108 that
concern does not exist when it comes to revealing a mug shot, which con-
stitutes a single data point. An access-friendly court would draw this piv-
otal factual distinction to evade the strictures of Reporters Committee,
and the seven-judge dissent in Detroit Free Press II, in fact, stressed this
discrepancy with Reporters Committee.109
B. NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION V. FAVISH110
In Favish, the Court extended “personal privacy” under Exemption
7(C) to include “surviving family members’ right to personal privacy with
respect to their close relative’s death-scene images.”111 The deceased in
Favish was Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Bill Clin-
ton.112 His family members objected to a request by Allan Favish for
color photographs showing Foster’s body at the scene of death.113
Foster’s death, attorney Joseph Romero writes, “generated a number
of conspiracy theories.”114 Indeed, Favish skeptically viewed the conclu-
sion reached by several investigations that Foster committed suicide.115
Favish contended that death-scene photos “could show discrepancies be-
tween official reports and the path of the gunshot that killed him.”116
In addition to extending the “personal privacy” right beyond the indi-
vidual named or depicted in an agency record—in Favish, Vincent Fos-
ter—to more broadly encompass the individual’s family members, the
Court addressed the “unwarranted invasion” aspect of the exemption
and, in turn, the burden imposed on the record requester. Here, Justice
Anthony Kennedy wrote for a unanimous Court that:
Where the privacy concerns addressed by Exemption 7(C) are pre-
sent, the exemption requires the person requesting the information
to establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure. First, the citizen
must show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a signifi-
cant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its
own sake. Second, the citizen must show the information is likely to
advance that interest. Otherwise, the invasion of privacy is
unwarranted.117
108. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 765
(1989).
109. See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir.
2016) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“The booking photographs at issue here, by contrast, do not
compile any information that is difficult to find.”).
110. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
111. Id. at 157.
112. Id. at 160.
113. Id. at 160–62.
114. Joseph Romero, National Archives & Record Administration v. Favish: Protecting
Against the Prying Eye, the Disbelievers, and the Curious, 50 Naval L. Rev. 70, 71 (2004).
115. Favish, 541 U.S. at 161.
116. Richard Willing, Court Skeptical About Need for Foster Photos, USA Today, Dec.
4, 2003, at 6A.
117. Favish, 541 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added).
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Kennedy added that in cases like Favish, where the alleged public in-
terest is demonstrating that government officials “acted negligently or
otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties, the requester
must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure.
Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief
by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might
have occurred.”118 The Court concluded that Allan Favish failed to meet
this burden,119 and thus, it ruled that the four death-scene images in ques-
tion were shielded from disclosure.120
Favish, as Professors Halstuk and Chamberlin write, marked the first
time the Supreme Court “recognized that FOIA-related privacy interests
apply to surviving family members of deceased subjects of an FOIA re-
quest.”121 Of particular importance for this article, however, is the role
the Internet played in the Court’s decision. Justice Kennedy, for example,
quoted the concern of Sheila Foster Anthony—Vincent Foster’s sister—
about the Internet: “I fear that the release of [additional] photographs
certainly would set off another round of intense scrutiny by the media.
Undoubtedly, the photographs would be placed on the Internet for world
consumption. Once again my family would be the focus of conceivably
unsavory and distasteful media coverage.”122
Kennedy linked the Foster family’s concern about Internet postings
with a neighboring paragraph describing “a sensation-seeking culture.”123
He later pointed out that after images are released under FOIA, they are
available to anyone and everyone. Kennedy explained that “[i]t must be
remembered that once there is disclosure, the information belongs to the
general public. There is no mechanism under FOIA for a protective order
allowing only the requester to see whether the information bears out his
theory, or for proscribing its general dissemination.”124 Connecting these
strands, Kennedy’s fear is palpable—once an image is released under
FOIA, it will migrate to the Internet where, in turn, it will feed the appe-
tite of “a sensation-seeking culture.”125
Favish’s concern regarding the Internet as a privacy-destructive force
laid the foundation for the Sixth Circuit’s 2016 decision in Detroit Free
Press II. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit cited Favish to support its conclusion
that “modern technology only heightens the consequences of disclo-
sure”126 under FOIA.127
Yet the concerns about Internet-caused harms that animate Favish are
quite distinct from those that seem to drive the Sixth Circuit in Detroit
118. Id. at 174.
119. Id. at 175.
120. Id.
121. Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 64, at 546.
122. Favish, 541 U.S. at 167.
123. Id. at 166.
124. Id. at 174.
125. Id. at 166.
126. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016).
127. See id. (citing Favish).
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Free Press II.128 In Favish, the harm is not to the person depicted in the
images but to his relatives, and it stems from gory death-scene images of
suicide becoming fodder for both the morbidly curious and a sensation-
seeking press. The harm, in turn, is the mental anguish caused by what
Justice Kennedy called such “unwarranted public exploitation.”129
In contrast, the harm in Detroit Free Press II is to those depicted in the
images, and it stems from two basic facts—identification and knowledge.
In particular, people who come across a mug shot on the Internet will be
able to identify the person therein—connecting a face to a name—and, in
turn, to know the person was once arrested. The harm of embarrassment
to the person in the mug shot that may flow from others knowing about
an arrest is not tantamount to unwarranted public exploitation of what
Justice Kennedy in Favish called “graphic details”130 of death. And to the
extent that commercial websites may exploit mug shots for profit, such
exploitation is better dealt with—as Section A of Part III argues—by di-
rect legislation.131
Additionally, the Favish Court drew support for its recognition of a
privacy interest in death-scene images under Exemption 7(C) from the
common law. As Justice Kennedy observed, a family’s privacy interest in
“death images of the deceased has long been recognized at common law.
Indeed, this right to privacy has much deeper roots in the common law
than the rap sheets held to be protected from disclosure in Reporters
Committee.”132 The Supreme Court in Favish cited a decision that was
then more than 100 years old to buttress this proposition.133 In contrast,
as the dissent in Detroit Free Press II points out, “the common law did
not, and does not now, recognize an indicted defendant’s interest in
preventing the disclosure of his booking photograph during ongoing crim-
inal proceedings,”134 and that today “[b]ooking photographs are either
available, or presumptively available, to the public under the law of most
states.”135
In brief, while concerns regarding the Internet animated both Favish
and Detroit Free Press II, the cases are readily distinguishable.
C. THE INTERNET AS GAME CHANGER FOR ACCESS TO IMAGES
Although this article concentrates on FOIA Exemption 7(C) and, in
part, the Sixth Circuit’s fears regarding the Internet dissemination of mug
shots in Detroit Free Press II, it is important to contextualize such issues
128. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 167 (quoting Sheila Foster Anthony’s worries about the
Internet in Favish).
129. Id. at 168.
130. Id. at 171.
131. See Part III, Section A, infra notes 218–234 and accompanying text.
132. Favish, 541 U.S. at 168.
133. Id. at 168–69 (quoting and citing Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895)).
134. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 490 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Boggs, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
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within broader judicial concerns for the tension between privacy and In-
ternet-posted images. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Marsh v. County of San Diego136 in 2012 held that the
U.S. Constitution, within the substantive due process privacy right, “pro-
tects a parent’s right to control the physical remains, memory and images
of a deceased child against unwarranted public exploitation by the gov-
ernment.”137 The case involved Brenda Marsh’s efforts to punish San Di-
ego County officials for releasing an autopsy image of her deceased two-
year-old son who had died of severe head injuries.138
In penning this pro-privacy decision for a unanimous three-judge panel,
Alex Kozinski favorably cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Favish for
support.139 The former chief judge of the Ninth Circuit also focused on
the Internet as a key factor, writing that Brenda Marsh claimed:
that when she learned that Coulter sent her son’s autopsy photo-
graph to the press, she was “horrified; and suffered severe emotional
distress, fearing the day that she would go on the Internet and find
her son’s hideous autopsy photos displayed there.” Marsh’s fear is
not unreasonable given the viral nature of the Internet, where she
might easily stumble upon photographs of her dead son on news
websites, blogs or social media websites.140
Marsh thus extends concerns about the Internet over images of death
beyond the Exemption 7(C) context of Favish to the realm of constitu-
tional law. Yet, the very gruesomeness of the underlying images in both
Marsh and Favish—an autopsy image of a child with a smashed skull and
four death-scene photos showing gunshots that killed a person—seems
far more disquieting and disturbing than anything depicted in a mug shot.
Put differently, the privacy concerns of immediate family members in see-
ing gruesome images of their loved ones—images that will reside on the
Internet where others can pruriently and voyeuristically feast on
them141—appear far more substantial than those of arrested individuals
who have routinized headshots taken by law enforcement as part of the
booking process.142
A 2016 decision by a federal district court in Arkansas in Whitney v.
Morse143 involving mug shots that are publicly available indicates that the
136. Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2012).
137. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 1152.
139. Id. at 1153.
140. Id. at 1155 (emphasis added and omitting from the quote a footnote citing Favish).
141. See generally Clay Calvert, The Privacy of Death: An Emergent Jurisprudence and
Legal Rebuke to Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Culture, 26 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev.
133 (2005) (addressing, in a now somewhat dated article, the intersection of privacy, death,
and voyeurism, as well as an emerging privacy-of-death jurisprudence).
142. For a thorough review of why the First Amendment should generally protect the
display of gruesome images, see Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 Cornell L. Rev.
901 (2015).
143. Whitney v. Morse, No. 14-5028, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29472 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 4,
2016), adopted, No. 5:14-CV-05028, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29465 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 8.,
2016).
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Internet does not need to play a game-changing role in the privacy equa-
tion. Specifically, James Whitney claimed that posting his mug shot and
the charges against him on a public website operated by the Washington
County Detention Center in Arkansas violated his federal constitutional
right to privacy and gave the appearance that he was guilty.144 He ar-
gued—much as the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free-Press II also as-
sumed145— “that individuals visiting the website presume you are
arrested because you are guilty.”146 While Whitney conceded that charges
and mug shots are matters of public record in Arkansas,147 he focused on
the fact that “the Defendants have made this publicly available informa-
tion more accessible by putting it on the Internet.”148
In ruling against Whitney’s privacy claim, however, U.S. Magistrate
Erin Setser found “that ‘it is now common for state and federal organiza-
tions to publish matters of public record electronically . . . Mugshots and
booking information are part of the public record, and in most states
members of the public who wish to look them up may freely do so.’”149
She added that “[c]learly there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the act of putting publicly available information on a web page
constitutes a shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation or a fla-
grant breach of a pledge of confidentiality.”150
Significantly, Magistrate Setser was not swayed either by Whitney’s ar-
gument that posting his mug shot on the Internet invaded his privacy by
making it “more accessible”151 or his contention “that individuals visiting
the website presume you are arrested because you are guilty.”152 In other
words, downstream harms supposedly wrought by the Internet-posting of
mug shots were rendered nugatory by Setser.
Key differences between Whitney and Detroit Free Press II, of course,
are that mug shots are part of the public record in Arkansas153 and that
the plaintiff in Whitney asserted a violation of a constitutional privacy
144. Id. at *4, *41–42.
145. See Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir.
2016) (asserting that “booking photos convey guilt to the viewer” and adding that “viewers
so uniformly associate booking photos with guilt and criminality that we strongly disfavor
showing such photos to criminal juries”) (emphasis in original).
146. Whitney, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29472, at *41.
147. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-103(7)(A) (2016) (defining public records in Arkan-
sas); see also Andaluz-Prado v. Helder, No. 5:16-CV-05123, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109588,
at *4 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 17, 2016) (“Arrest records, including any booking photographs, are
public records and are not protected from disclosure”).
148. Whitney, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29472, at *44 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at *44–45 (quoting Michael Polastek, Extortion Through the Public Record:
Has the Internet Made Florida’s Sunshine Law Too Bright?, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 913, 915–16
(2014)).
150. Id. at *45.
151. Id. at *44.
152. Id. at *41.
153. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-103(7)(A) (2016) (defining public records in Arkan-
sas); see also Andaluz-Prado v. Helder, No. 5:16-CV-05123, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109588,
at *4 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 17, 2016) (describing how mug shots are part of the public record in
Arkansas).
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right. Yet, in Detroit Free Press II, the only barrier prohibiting mug shots
from becoming publicly available is a USMS policy154 that, in turn, de-
pends on judicial interpretation for its enforcement of an exemption from
a statute (FOIA) generally favoring access. Whitney simply illustrates
that once mug shots are made public (as they are in Arkansas), the fact
that they may migrate to the Internet does not necessarily tilt the access
equation in favor of privacy.
With this in mind, the article next examines how tort law might treat
the publication of the mug shots at issue in Detroit Free Press II.
II. TORT LAW PRINCIPLES OF PRIVACY AND IIED:
ESTABLISHING GROUNDS FOR COMPARISON WITH
EXEMPTION 7(C) AND REVEALING WHY TORT
RECOVERY WOULD BE PRECLUDED
Why is it helpful to compare the Sixth Circuit’s 2016 decision in Detroit
Free Press II involving FOIA Exemption 7(C) with tort law principles?
Professor Lior Jacob Strahilevitz of the University of Chicago Law School
explains, “[i]t is natural to analogize between the common law invasion of
privacy and the statutory ‘unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’”155
terminology found in FOIA Exemption 7(C). Strahilevitz asserts that:
[i]f the disclosure of information would constitute a tortious invasion
of privacy had a private party engaged in it, then the disclosure of the
same information by the government would be inappropriate under
FOIA. Many state courts have construed the privacy exemptions in
their own states’ versions of FOIA in precisely that way.156
Importantly, Strahilevitz points out that although “there is nothing in
the legislative history to suggest that FOIA privacy should track tort pri-
vacy,”157 there also “is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that
FOIA privacy should not track the common law.”158 Citing both Report-
ers Committee and Favish and arguing that the results in those cases likely
would have been different had the Court applied tort principles,
Strahilevitz concludes that “the Supreme Court has made errors in both
of its landmark FOIA privacy precedents and those are mistakes that
would have been averted had FOIA privacy doctrine simply followed
well-established privacy tort principles.”159
154. See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir.
2016); see also Memorandum to All United States Marshals et al., OFFICE OF THE GEN-
ERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 12, 2012), at 2–3, https://www.usmarshals
.gov/foia/policy/booking_photos.pdf [https://perma.cc/27VF-QPX4] (describing the USMS
policy).
155. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 2007, 2020
(2010).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2021.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2024.
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In brief, then, tort law can help guide FOIA disputes involving privacy
and reconcile these bodies of law in coherent fashion. Sections A and B
below thus consider, respectively, the elements of the torts of public dis-
closure of private facts and IIED. These sections also illustrate that a per-
son suing under these theories based upon the public posting of a mug
shot, under applicable Michigan law in Detroit Free Press II, is highly
unlikely to recover damages.
Consider this hypothetical: Journalists at the Detroit Free Press news-
paper obtain, from a source at the USMS, mug shots of the four officers
that the newspaper now seeks.160 The newspaper then posts those mug
shots on its website, accompanying a story regarding the officers’ arrests.
Keeping in mind that the Justice Department did, in fact, publicly reveal
the officers’ names more than three years ago in a still-available, In-
ternet-posted press release touting their arrests,161 the question is this:
Would the officers be able to successfully sue the Detroit Free Press for
either public disclosure of private facts or IIED in their home state of
Michigan? Those are the key tort issues examined below, rather than
what might be considered the separate Bartnicki issue regarding publish-
ing lawfully obtained truthful information about a matter of public
concern.162
A. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
In 1960, Dean William Prosser famously catalogued four privacy
torts.163 One was public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.164
Under the public disclosure tort, as encapsulated in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, a person:
who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.165
Summarized recently by Tulane Professor Amy Gajda, this means that
“a plaintiff who wishes to sue a publication for publishing private facts
160. See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 16 F. Supp. 3d 798, 806 (E.D.
Mich. 2014), rev’d, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (describing the underlying facts regarding
the mug shots at issue in Detroit Free Press II).
161. Supra note 21.
162. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527–28 (2001) (observing that publication of
lawfully obtained truthful information about a matter of public significance is protected by
the First Amendment unless the government demonstrates an interest of the highest order
justifying its punishment).
163. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 382, 389 (1960); see Neil M. Richards
& Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1887, 1890
(2010) (noting that “[c]ourts readily embraced Prosser’s formulation of privacy tort law”
and adding that Prosser’s “influence encouraged courts and commentators to adopt his
division of tort privacy into the four causes of action of intrusion, disclosure, false light, and
appropriation”).
164. Prosser, supra note 163, at 389.
165. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
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about her must show both that the revelation would be offensive to a
reasonable person and that the revelation itself was not newsworthy.”166
Simply put by Yale Law School Dean Robert Post, the tort “attempts to
regulate the publicizing of private life.”167
The Supreme Court of Michigan (the ultimate legal authority in the
hypothetical here) recognizes Prosser’s four privacy torts, including pub-
lic disclosure of private facts.168 Consistent with the Restatement’s defini-
tion, Michigan’s high court observed in 1991 that “public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts ‘requires that the disclosed information be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and of no legitimate concern to
the public.’”169 A Michigan appellate court notes that “[i]nformation of a
legitimate concern to the public includes matters regarded as ‘news.’”170
Indeed, what is a matter of public concern and what constitutes news
overlap in the public disclosure tort.171
Regarding the hypothetical lawsuit above involving the website-posting
of the officers’ mug shots, the newspaper must concede the publicity ele-
ment. It is satisfied under Michigan law when a message is communicated
to the “public in general.”172 This comports with the typical understand-
ing of the tort in which, as Professors Kent Middleton and William Lee
ably explain, a “plaintiff must usually show that a wide audience was ex-
posed to the publication.”173 Posting mug shots on the newspaper’s web-
site plainly meets this criterion.
As to the remaining three elements of the public disclosure tort, how-
ever, the officers’ case significantly weakens. In fact, at the tort’s macro
level, the Michigan Supreme Court has quoted favorably a comment from
the Restatement that “[a]uthorized publicity includes publications con-
cerning homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides, mar-
riages and divorces.”174 Mug shots, of course, are a requisite part of the
intake process following an arrest, which is a matter of legitimate public
concern.175 Thus, while the officers can prove publicity, such publicity
166. Amy Gajda, The First Amendment Bubble: How Privacy and Paparazzi Threaten
a Free Press 31 (2015).
167. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 978 (1989).
168. Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 527–29 (Mich. 1977).
169. Swickard v. Wayne Cty. Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 310 (Mich. 1991) (quoting
Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 300 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)).
170. Fry, 300 N.W.2d at 690.
171. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,
1829 (2010) (“Courts dismiss public disclosure claims where information addresses a news-
worthy matter, in other words, one of public concern.”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen
Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 580 (2007) (noting that a
newsworthiness standard “involves essentially the same inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test”).
172. Beaumont, 257 N.W.2d at 530.
173. Kent R. Middleton & William E. Lee, The Law of Public Communication 175 (9th
ed. 2014).
174. Swickard, 475 N.W.2d at 310 (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652D cmt. g (1977)).
175. See O’Brien v. Perry, No. CV 9805845035, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 439, at *6
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (“Arrests are matters of legitimate public interests.”).
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concerning arrests is authorized and thus is non-actionable.176 The lawsuit
likely dies there.
Drilling deeper, however, for the sake of argument, into the remaining
elements, mug shots are not private facts because people have no reason-
able privacy expectations in them. Why? Because mug shots are used by
police “for eyewitness identification.”177
For example, mug shots might “be shown to the victim of a robbery in
the hope that the victim will be able to identify the perpetrator or to
exclude innocent suspects.”178 In other words, a key purpose for the exis-
tence of mug shots pivots on the very fact that other people—perhaps
several dozens of others—will, indeed, see them in the process of a crimi-
nal investigation. The images thus are never intended to remain private,
and today, along with fingerprint impressions, they are “benchmarks of
social acceptance for at least some identification purposes.”179
Additionally, there is nothing private or intimate about the image cap-
tured in a mug shot. It is, in brief, an impression of a person’s face—
something often visibly displayed to the public every day of a person’s
life. It is well established that “[o]ne cannot base liability upon something
that is open to the public eye”180 and that “a person’s image in and of
itself is not a ‘private fact.’”181
The newspaper thus would argue that one’s face simply is not a private
fact, even if the suspect finds a photograph of it unflattering. This stands
in stark contrast to a Michigan case recognizing the generally “private
nature of . . . genitalia”182 in the context of a public disclosure cause of
action. Indeed, as First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla explains, the
public disclosure tort involves only “truly intimate or private matters . . .
such as one’s private sexual affairs or intimate details about the health of
one’s self or family.”183
In addition to needing to prove the existence of a private fact, a plain-
tiff suing for public disclosure must demonstrate that the publicity given
to it is highly offensive to a reasonable person.184 As Dean Prosser wrote,
“[t]he law of privacy is not intended for the protection of any shrinking
176. Michigan is not the only court to conclude that arrests are newsworthy. As the
Supreme Court of California notes, “[n]ewspapers have traditionally reported arrests or
other incidents involving suspected criminal activity, and courts have universally concluded
that such events are newsworthy matters of which the public has the right to be informed.”
Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 924 (Cal. 1969).
177. Whitney T. Martin, Note, From the Police Precinct to Your Neighbor’s Coffee Ta-
ble: Limiting Public Dissemination of Mug Shots During an Ongoing Criminal Proceeding
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1431, 1445 (2014).
178. D. H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 Cornell J. L. &
Pub. Pol’y 455, 487 (2001).
179. Eric T. Juengst, I-DNA-Fication, Personal Privacy, and Social Justice, 75 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 61, 63 (1999).
180. Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 893 A.2d 837, 845 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
181. Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
182. Granger v. Klein, 197 F. Supp. 2d 851, 868 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
183. Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 10:39 (2d ed. 2016 rel.).
184. Supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text.
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soul who is abnormally sensitive about such publicity.”185 In a case noted
above, the publicity afforded to a person’s genitals in a yearbook photo
may well be highly offensive to a reasonable person,186 but that is far
different from the posting of a mug shot on a newspaper website accom-
panying a story about the arrest of the individual depicted in therein.
In fact, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy cites multiple cases suggesting
that the public disclosure of facts and images that typically are highly
offensive relate to: nudity and sexual matters; medical, health and disease
conditions and procedures; and the disclosure of past facts such as being
the victim of child molestation.187 Thus, it is extremely doubtful a court
would consider “highly offensive” a newspaper posting a perfunctorily
taken mug shot on the Internet.
The final element of the public disclosure tort requires plaintiffs to
prove the information is not of legitimate public concern.188 The question
becomes whether the publication of mug shots of police officers accused
of criminal wrongdoing—and that accompany a story about said alleged
wrongdoing—is newsworthy.
Cases involving charges of misconduct against on-duty police officers
have been considered matters of public concern for decades.189 Police of-
ficers are government employees, accountable to the public. The mug
shots provide visual information to the public regarding the police of-
ficers accused of wrongdoing and, in turn, “[i]nformation concerning the
possible guilt or innocence of a person charged with a crime is a classic
example of a matter of legitimate public concern.”190
Courts generally consider the opposite of newsworthiness to be a
“morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.”191
This language flows from a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
on the public disclosure cause of action. The comment provides that in
determining what separates a matter of public concern from one of pri-
vate interest, “[t]he line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a mor-
bid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.”192 This
185. Prosser, supra note 163, at 397.
186. Granger, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
187. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 552–56 (2015
ed. 2015).
188. See Fry v. Ionia Sentinel Standard, 300 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(observing that a successful claim for public disclosure of private facts requires that the
information published be “of no legitimate concern to the public”).
189. Rawlins v. Hutchinson Pub. Co., 543 P.2d 988, 996 (Kan. 1975) (observing, in a
case involving a police-officer plaintiff, that “official misconduct is newsworthy when it
occurs, and remains so for so long as anyone thinks it worth retelling”).
190. Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007).
191. See Wilkins v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 329, 340–41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (using this phrase twice to describe material that is not newsworthy in the context of
a public disclosure of private facts cause of action).
192. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, cmt. h (1977).
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language has been embraced by numerous courts over the years.193
It seems tremendously doubtful that the vast majority of images in mug
shots are morbid and sensational because the photo is simply of a per-
son’s head and shoulders. Furthermore, even if a person depicted in a
mug shot may have what some consider to be a sensational-looking ap-
pearance, such as the mug shot of Arizona mass-killer Jared Loughner,194
publishing such a mug shot, at least within the context of a news story, is
not a morbid and sensational prying into one’s life for its own sake. The
mug shot, instead, is published for the purpose of showing the public
what the person looks like.
In summary, it is exceedingly improbable that a police officer in the
hypothetical would prevail on a cause of action for public disclosure of
private facts.
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A cause of action for IIED, which all states today recognize,195 gener-
ally “consists of four elements: (1) the defendant’s conduct must be inten-
tional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable, (3)
the defendant’s conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and
(4) the distress must be severe.”196 Parsed more concisely, a successful
IIED claim requires “severe emotional distress caused by outrageous
conduct that exceeds the bounds that ought to be tolerated by civilized
society.”197
Although the Supreme Court of Michigan “has not dispositively ad-
dressed the establishment, and the contours, of the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress,”198 intermediate appellate courts in the
Great Lakes State recognize IIED. In 1995, for example, a Michigan ap-
pellate court wrote that the elements of IIED “are: (1) extreme and out-
rageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe
emotional distress.”199 The appellate court elaborated that liability for
193. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLP, 572 F.3d 1201, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009);
Alvarado v. KOB-TV, 493 F.3d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d
1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
194. Colby Hall, This Is Unsettling, Mediaite.com (July 10, 2011), http://www.mediaite
.com/online/this-is-unsettling-jared-loughners-mug-shot-released [https://perma.cc/F8JA-
XYBC].
195. Elizabeth M. Jaffee, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones but Extreme and Out-
rageous Conduct Will Never Hurt Me: The Demise of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims in the Aftermath of Snyder v. Phelps, 57 Wayne L. Rev. 473, 479 (2011)
(“IIED is recognized as a recoverable cause of action in all U.S. jurisdictions.”); John J.
Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 789,
806 (2007) (“All states have recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress as an
independent tort and have adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46 in some
form.”) (emphasis added).
196. Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a
Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000).
197. William R. Corbitt, An Outrageous Response to “You’re Fired!”, 92 N.C. L. Rev.
Addendum 17, 43–44 (2013).
198. Melson v. Botas, 863 N.W.2d 674, 674 (Mich. 2015) (Markman, J., dissenting).
199. Johnson v. Wayne Cty., 540 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
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IIED exists “only where the conduct complained of has been so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolera-
ble in a civilized community.”200 Mere annoyances and indignities do not
rise to this level in Michigan.201
In the hypothetical above, the officers very likely lose an IIED claim
for multiple reasons. First, posting truthful, headshot images of people
taken by the government upon their official intake to the criminal justice
system—a system presumptively open202—seems like anything but ex-
treme and outrageous conduct falling outside the bounds of decency in a
civilized society. The Detroit Free Press should argue here that a civilized,
democratic society publishes truthful information regarding its alleged
criminal activity and those accused of it. More directly put, newsworthi-
ness negates outrageousness.
Publishing mug shots is a far cry, for instance, from posting hidden-
camera video of a person engaged in sexual activity in a bedroom without
his consent.203 Although IIED may pave a road to recovery for victims of
so-called revenge porn204 who find images of their sexual activity posted
on the Internet without consent,205 a mug shot is extremely different, re-
vealing only a person’s shoulders and head, devoid of sexual activity, inti-
mate or otherwise.
Furthermore, publishing mug shots is extremely different from dissemi-
nating close-up images of a young girl’s skull—images a Florida court
called “gruesome and macabre”206 —that may well constitute extreme
200. Id.
201. Shaya v. Belcastro, No. 14-11112, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76218, at *77 (E.D. Mich.
June 10, 2016).
202. See Kirtley, supra note 73, at 98–99 (noting “the long tradition in the United States
of allowing public access to executive branch records, such as arrest records, that are re-
lated to the criminal justice system” and pointing out that the U.S. Supreme Court “has
ruled that criminal judicial proceedings and transcripts are presumptively open to the pub-
lic”). But see Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40
(1999) (“California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violat-
ing the First Amendment.”).
203. Terry Gene Bollea, better known by his wrestling name of Hulk Hogan, prevailed
on a cause of action for IIED—along with several other legal theories—in early 2016
before a Florida jury based upon the Internet-posting of a sex tape depicting him that he
claimed was made without his knowledge or permission. See Verdict at 5–6, Bollea v.
Gawker Media, LLC, No. 12012447-CI-011 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 18, 2016); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Privacy Versus Speech in the Hulk Hogan Sex Tape Trial, L.A. Times, Mar.
14, 2016, at A15 (writing that the case “revolves around a videotape showing the wrestler
Hulk Hogan, whose real name is Terry G. Bollea, having sex with the wife of a friend.
Apparently, the friend, radio host Bubba ‘the Love Sponge’ Clem, took the video without
Bollea’s consent or knowledge.”).
204. See Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism And Discrimination In Cyber-
space, 20 Colum. J. Gender & L. 224, 227 (2011) (asserting, in gender-specific fashion, that
revenge porn is “a practice where ex-boyfriends and husbands post to the web sexually
explicit photographs and videos of them without their consent”).
205. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech, 48 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 57, 80 (2014) (asserting that “the online posting of revenge porn would seem to be an
eminently suitable example of outrageous conduct” for which IIED should provide relief).
206. Armstrong v. H & C Commc’ns, Inc., 575 So.2d 280, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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and outrageous behavior by a news organization. As the Florida appellate
court in Armstrong v. H & C Communications wrote, “[w]e have no diffi-
culty in concluding that reasonable persons in the community could find
that the alleged conduct . . . was outrageous in character and exceeded
the bounds of decency so as to be intolerable in a civilized commu-
nity.”207 In that case, the news organization even admitted that the
staged, closed-up images of the skull were not newsworthy.208
Second, the intent of the Detroit Free Press in publishing mug shots of
the four police officers is completely unrelated to trying to cause them
emotional distress. Instead, the newspaper’s purpose is to educate readers
about alleged wrongdoings of government officials by putting faces to
names. People recognizing the officers by their images and thus discover-
ing they were also detained or arrested by them may, in turn, have
grounds to question the validity of their interactions with them.
A claim for IIED, however, can exist in the absence of intent to cause
emotional distress if the defendant acted with recklessness in causing
such distress. Recklessness in Michigan entails that a reasonable person
would know from his or her actions that emotional distress would re-
sult.209 On this point, the Detroit Free Press would be wise to argue that
emotional distress stemming from worries about potential non-em-
ployability due to the publication of a mug shot simply is too speculative
to be reasonably foreseeable. In other words, the worries (the emotional
distress, as it were) are caused by possibilities—not necessarily realities—
of the downstream actions that might be taken by others regarding how
they could, but not necessarily will, react to a mug shot. The publisher of
a mug shot cannot, in brief, prognosticate how others will ultimately un-
derstand or interpret it.
Furthermore, the Detroit Free Press should contest causation. In partic-
ular, is it the publishing of a mug shot that causes emotional distress or,
far more likely, is it the fact that the person’s name and identity (regard-
less of pictorial image) become publicly known as part of the arrest record
that causes the purported emotional distress? In other words, if a plaintiff
truly suffers emotional distress after being arrested, is it because people
will identify him by his name or, instead, that people will recognize his
face? Or—a third possibility—is the sense of shame purely from an inter-
nal feeling of guilt or remorse about one’s own actions, regardless of how
others feel? Put more simply, is it other people knowing the name or
knowing the face that causes emotional harm? And if any harm, in fact,
exists, it may be due to speculative, downstream fears of being unemploy-
able because prospective employers later discover the fact the person was
once arrested. These issues disrupt the requisite causal connection of
emotional distress stemming from publication of a photograph.
207. Id. at 282.
208. Id. at 281.
209. Haverbush v. Powelson, 551 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
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By way of comparison, what happens if a newspaper lists the names of
individuals arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, but
does not also publish their mug shots? Those arrested individuals might
likely be embarrassed (and suffer emotional distress, be it the IIED-man-
dated severe level or otherwise) simply because other people learn they
were arrested for DUI, regardless of whether a mug shot is published
alongside their name. In brief, is the harm caused by name or facial rec-
ognition? That question—between the power of words versus the power
of images—clouds, complicates, and convolutes the causation inquiry,
and it never was addressed in Detroit Free Press II.
Finally, and certainly not least, is the veneer of First Amendment pro-
tection the Supreme Court grants defendants in speech-based IIED cases.
As the Court wrote in 2011 in Snyder v. Phelps,210 “[t]he Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment— ‘Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech’—can serve as a defense in state tort
suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”211 In
particular, if speech affects a matter of public concern, then this likely
results in a ruling against an IIED plaintiff.212
Writing for the Snyder majority, Chief Justice John Roberts explained
that speech addresses “matters of public concern when it can ‘be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community,’” or when it “‘is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the pub-
lic.’”213 Alleged criminal activity—the reason mug shots exist—certainly
is of social concern to people in the community affected by that activity.
As a California appellate court wrote in 2003, “[n]ews reports concerning
current criminal activity serve important public interests.”214 Addition-
ally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2007 concluded
that “[i]nformation concerning the possible guilt or innocence of a person
charged with a crime is a classic example of a matter of legitimate public
concern.”215 In brief, to be accused—even if not convicted—is
newsworthy.
Moreover, alleged criminal activity is of general value to community
members who might identify an individual from a mug shot and, in turn,
connect him or her with other possible wrongdoings. In the specific case
involving the Detroit Free Press, the charges pertain to allegations of brib-
ery and drug conspiracy against government officials—namely, four po-
210. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
211. Id. at 451.
212. See id. (observing that the outcome of the case “turns largely on whether that
speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case”).
213. Id. at 453 (internal citations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 146 (1983) and City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). Addition-
ally, Roberts pinpointed three factors—content, form, and context of the speech—for
courts to use in deciding whether speech involves a matter of public or private concern. Id.
214. Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
215. Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
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lice officers216—thereby heightening the newsworthiness of their images.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for instance, has held
that “[t]he content of the speech may involve a matter of public concern
if it attempts “‘to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach
of public trust on the part of government officials.’”217
In summary, it is extremely doubtful the officers involved in Detroit
Free Press II would recover damages if they sued for either public disclo-
sure of private facts or IIED based on the newspaper’s publication of
their mug shots. There is, then, a decided disconnect between tort law and
FOIA when it comes to safeguarding supposed privacy interests in mug
shots. With this in mind, the next Part critiques three key aspects of the
Sixth Circuit’s logic in Detroit Free Press II.
III. THE MAJORITY’S LOGIC IN DETROIT FREE PRESS II:
CRITIQUING A TRIO OF CRUCIAL FACTORS
This Part has three sections, each of which analyzes a different facet of
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in recognizing a privacy interest in mug shots
under FOIA Exemption 7(C).
A. THE INTERNET AND MUG SHOT WEBSITES
A key part of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Detroit Free Press II to
reverse its decision from two decades ago focused on the possibility that
mug shots exist in perpetuity on the Internet and thus may haunt a person
later in life. As the appellate court wrote, “[i]n 1996, when we decided
Free Press I, booking photos appeared on television or in the newspaper
and then, for all practical purposes, disappeared. Today, an idle Internet
search reveals the same booking photo that once would have required a
trip to the local library’s microfiche collection.”218
The Sixth Circuit majority drilled deeper into the Internet issue, ex-
pressing specific concern about commercial websites that post mug shots.
It asserted that BustedMugshots and JustMugshots “collect and display
booking photos from decades-old arrests.”219 The danger, the Sixth Cir-
cuit explained, is that “[p]otential employers and other acquaintances
may easily access booking photos on these websites, hampering the de-
picted individual’s professional and personal prospects.”220
Individuals depicted in mug shots who want to avoid such deleterious
consequences, the Sixth Circuit pointed out, must expend both time and
money. Specifically, they need to “pay such sites to remove their pictures.
Indeed, an online-reputation-management industry now exists, promising
216. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 16 F. Supp. 3d 798, 806 (E.D.
Mich. 2014), rev’d, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016); see Arrest Press Release, supra note 21.
217. Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1993)).
218. Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 483.
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to banish unsavory information—a booking photo, a viral tweet—to the
third or fourth page of Internet search results, where few persist in click-
ing.”221 The court concluded that such “steps many take to squelch pub-
licity of booking photos reinforce a statutory privacy interest.”222 In fact,
the New York Times notes that “for-profit Web sites, with names like
Mugshots, BustedMugshots and JustMugshots”223 prosper “by charging a
fee to remove the image. That fee can be anywhere from $30 to $400, or
even higher. Pay up, in other words, and the picture is deleted, at least
from the site that was paid.”224
Stretching the interpretation of Exemption 7(C) to include a privacy
interest in mug shots due to such an Internet-based parade of horrors,
however, is misguided. First, problems wrought by mug-shot websites are
better addressed by legislation directly targeting them, rather than by an
expansive judicial interpretation of a statute adopted long before such
sites even existed. Indeed, the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) notes that multiple states already had taken legislative action
aimed at such sites by early 2016.225 The NCSL reports that:
Georgia, Illinois, Oregon, Texas and Utah in 2013 enacted legislation
to address these concerns by prohibiting commercial sites from
charging fees for removing inaccurate mug shots upon request or by
prohibiting sheriffs from releasing mug shots to sites that charge a
fee, among other provisions. California, Colorado, Georgia, Missouri
and Wyoming passed laws in 2014; in Maryland and Virginia in 2015;
Kentucky and South Carolina in 2016.226
For example, consider Oregon Revised Statute § 646A.806.227 It ap-
plies to websites that charge a fee for removing mug shots.228 The statute
requires such sites to remove—free of charge and upon written request—
mug shots and related personal information of anyone who can prove
that “all charges stemming from the arrest for which the photograph was
made: (A) Were resolved through acquittal or otherwise without a con-
viction; (B) Were reduced to violations; or (C) Following conviction, were
expunged or set aside pursuant to court order.”229
If the problem that must be addressed pertains to mug-shot websites,
then the solution is to target them directly and specifically with legisla-
tion. The judicial response in Detroit Free Press II, instead, creates a pri-
vacy interest that broadly affects everyone’s access to mug shots held by
U.S. Marshals. In an effort to push back against mug-shot websites, the
221. Id.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. David Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2013, at BU1.
224. Id.
225. Mug Shots and Booking Photos Websites, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures,
Apr. 13, 2016, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technol-
ogy/mug-shots-and-booking-photo-websites.aspx [https://perma.cc/JRQ5-SJ44].
226. Id.
227. OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.806 (2016).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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Sixth Circuit’s decision is vastly overbroad because it applies to any and
all media outlets—mainstream news organizations like the Detroit Free
Press included—that seek access to mug shots.
The sweep of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling unnecessarily carpet bombs all
media organizations. A more surgically precise strike to mitigate the
problem would be both more appropriate and proportionate. As attorney
Gregg Leslie of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
states, “[t]he appropriate remedy is to stop them [mug-shot websites]
from doing that . . . rather than to deny everyone access to mug shots.”230
Second, the Sixth Circuit’s focus on the fact “a booking photo could
haunt the depicted individual for decades”231 in the Internet age seems,
albeit sub silentio, to be concerned with protecting individuals who are
either acquitted or against whom all charges are dropped. Colloquially
put, the worry appears to be with protecting the innocent. But what about
individuals who are, in fact, later convicted or who plead guilty to crimi-
nal charges? Should a court be similarly acutely concerned about shield-
ing them from being haunted by their proven guilt or admitted past
criminal wrongdoings? The Sixth Circuit failed to consider this important
distinction in any way. Instead, it adopted a far-reaching ruling that every-
one depicted in a mug shot has a privacy interest, even if they later are
convicted of the gravest and most heinous of criminal offenses.
Finally, responses from private entities to the Sixth Circuit’s concern
about mug-shot websites already are proving potent in dramatically
weakening those interests. Specifically, Google has “allowed de-ranking
of search results containing mug shots of people.”232 Indeed, the mam-
moth search engine company “altered its search algorithms to reduce
such sites’ salience.”233 Additionally, as the New York Times reported,
major credit card companies such as MasterCard and American Express,
along with online pay service PayPal, are cutting off their services for
commercial mug-shot websites.234
In summary, if the problem is commercial mug-shot websites, there are
multiple ways of addressing it—from state legislation to the actions of
private entities such as search engine and credit card companies—other
than a judicial decision negatively affecting all media organizations.
B. PUBLIC IGNORANCE OF THE MEANING OF MUG SHOTS
A second vital factor for the Sixth Circuit in recognizing a privacy in-
terest in mug shots pertains directly to how, supposedly, many members
230. Laura C. Morel, Arrest Photos That Won’t Die, Tampa Bay Times, Nov. 11, 2013,
at 1B.
231. Detroit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2016).
232. Edward Lee, The Right to be Forgotten v. Free Speech, 12 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 85, 107 (2015).
233. Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 515, 537
(2015).
234. David Segal, Mug-Shot Websites, Retreating or Adapting, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
2013, at BU3.
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of the public wrongly interpret what the images signal about those de-
picted in them. Writing for the Detroit Free Press II majority, Judge
Deborah Cook asserted that “booking photos convey guilt to the
viewer.”235 She added that “viewers so uniformly associate booking
photos with guilt and criminality that we strongly disfavor showing such
photos to criminal juries . . . This alone establishes a non-trivial privacy
interest in booking photos.”236
There is a vast difference, however, between jurors who misunderstand
the nature of a mug shot in a criminal trial and people who may mis-
perceive their meaning when coming upon them on the Internet. Pre-
cisely, the misunderstanding of a mug shot’s meaning in a criminal
prosecution jeopardizes a person’s Sixth Amendment237 right to a fair
trial and, in turn, could wrongly result in his or her incarceration.238 In
brief, the consequences of a juror misunderstanding the meaning of a
mug shot in a criminal trial are enormous. A person’s very liberty and
freedom may be sacrificed because of the alleged prejudicial nature of a
mug shot that is introduced into evidence.
The consequence of incarceration stemming from possible misunder-
standing of a mug shot in a criminal case simply is absent in other con-
texts where a person stumbling upon an Internet-posted mug shot. In a
nutshell, the emotional harms of embarrassment and humiliation that the
Sixth Circuit majority suggests a person feels when someone else discov-
ers he or she has been arrested239 are nowhere near the magnitude or
severity of the harm of being locked up in prison or jail. And even the
possible economic harm of being denied a job because a potential em-
ployer learns of a person’s arrest through a mug shot is not tantamount to
being deprived of the physical liberty of freedom of movement resulting
from incarceration.240 Put differently, concerns about the Sixth Amend-
ment and the right to a fair trial that may justify prohibiting the use of
235. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2016)
(emphasis in original).
236. Id. (internal citations omitted).
237. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
238. See Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1979) (“The use of
mug shots has been strongly condemned in federal trials, as effectively eliminating the
presumption of innocence and replacing it with an unmistakable badge of criminality.”).
239. See Detroit Free Press II, 829 F.3d at 482 (asserting that booking photos “fit
squarely within this realm of embarrassing and humiliating information”).
240. See id. at 483 (“Potential employers and other acquaintances may easily access
booking photos on these websites, hampering the depicted individual’s professional and
personal prospects.”).
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mug shots in criminal prosecutions do not justify stopping their dissemi-
nation outside of the courtroom context.
Furthermore, it smacks of judicial paternalism to prevent the release of
mug shots due to the perceived ignorance of some members of the Amer-
ican public who may not understand them. Essentially, the Sixth Circuit’s
decision rests largely on protecting those depicted in mug shots from the
lack of legal literacy of potential audience members—namely, Internet
users—who may view them. Erroneous perception of some unwitting
people, in other words, justifies judicial recognition of a non-explicit stat-
utory privacy interest in mug shots, in the Sixth Circuit’s view.
This is simply wrong. It illustrates Professor Wat Hopkins’ point that
the “FOIA is not doing the job that was intended, and that a major over-
haul of the act is needed to ensure requisite access to government docu-
ments and activities.”241 The cure for a lack of legal literacy about the
meaning of mug shots is education, not censorship.
C. EMBARRASSMENT AND HUMILIATION
In recognizing a privacy interest in mug shots, the Sixth Circuit major-
ity argued that a mug shot constitutes “embarrassing and humiliating in-
formation.”242 Such mental anguish, along with the possibility of being
denied a job because a potential employer stumbles upon a mug shot,243
constitutes the supposed harms justifying a privacy interest in mug shots
that, via Exemption 7(C), impedes public access to the truthful informa-
tion they reveal.
Initially, it must be pointed out that embarrassment—a central concern
of the Sixth Circuit244—in the Internet era simply is a reality of modern
life. According to a Washington Post poll conducted in November 2013,
“[o]ne in four Americans ages 18 to 29 reported being embarrassed or
upset by something that appeared online about them.”245 Similarly, hav-
ing an arrest record is a reality of life for many in the United States. As
legal scholar Brian Murray wrote in 2016, “[i]t is estimated that between
twenty-five and thirty-five percent of the adult population of the United
States has a criminal record,”246 while a whopping “[r]oughly one-third of
adults have been arrested by age twenty-three.”247 One might reasonably
wonder whether the embarrassment or humiliation of an arrest is some-
what diminished today when so many people, in fact, have been arrested.
241. W. Wat Hopkins, Special Issue: The U.S. Freedom of Information Act At 50: Edi-
tor’s Note, 21 Comm. L & Pol’y 431, 432 (2016).
242. Detroit Free Press II, 829 F.3d at 482.
243. See id. at 483 (“Potential employers and other acquaintances may easily access
booking photos on these websites, hampering the depicted individual’s professional and
personal prospects.”).
244. See Detroit Free Press II, 829 F.3d at 482.
245. Craig Timberg & Sarah Halzack, Google Case Pits Right to be Forgotten vs. Free
Speech, Wash. Post, May 15, 2014, at A10.
246. Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Develop-
ments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 361, 363 (2016).
247. Id.
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Similarly, one might query whether it is the proper role of the judiciary to
pushback, in the name of privacy, against what amounts to a mass-arrest
criminal justice system.
More importantly, an implicit assumption underlying the Detroit Free
Press II majority’s concern with embarrassment and humiliation purport-
edly caused by mug shots is the belief that visual images are somehow
more embarrassing or humiliating than are written facts. What, in other
words, is the real cause of any embarrassment and humiliation stemming
from an arrest—that others know the fact that a person has been arrested
or that others know how the person looked shortly after they were ar-
rested? Should courts, as the Sixth Circuit majority did, create an artifi-
cial dichotomy between words and images when it comes to
information—written versus pictorial—about an arrest?
The Detroit Free Press II dissent, for instance, pointed out that much
factual information about a person’s brushes with the law is now easily
available online, not simply mug shots. Writing for the dissent, Judge
Danny Julian Boggs called attention to “the now-digitized information
that was once hidden away in the dusty basements of courthouses and
libraries.”248 He questioningly wrote:
Surely the majority would not agree that an individual has a cogniza-
ble privacy interest in his court filings or public statements simply
because they too may turn up in an “idle internet search.” If any-
thing, the ease with which a third party today can find an individual’s
indictment and arrest would seem to cut against finding a cognizable
privacy interest in booking photographs.249
For example, one can easily find in multiple places on the Internet the
names of the four officers who were arrested and whose mug shots are at
the heart of Detroit Free Press II. They are, for example, identified in a
post-arrest press release on the Department of Justice’s website.250 They
are named in a press release posted by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion on its website describing the outcome of the criminal cases against all
four officers.251 They are also identified in several newspaper stories on
the Internet.252
248. Detroit Free Press II, 829 F.3d at 491 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. See Arrest Press Release, supra note 21 (“The four Highland Park police officers
charged are: Anthony Bynum, 29, of Highland Park, Michigan; Price Montgomery, 38, of
Highland Park, Michigan; Shawn Williams, 33, of Detroit, Michigan; and Craig Clayton, 55,
of Highland Park, Michigan.”).
251. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Former Highland Park Police Officer Sen-
tenced to Prison for Taking a $10,000 Bribe (Mar. 7, 2014), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
detroit/press-releases/2014/former-highland-park-police-officer-sentenced-to-prison-for-
taking-a-10-000-bribe [https://perma.cc/96H8-NN2B].
252. See, e.g., Four Highland Park Police Officers Arrested, Oakland Press News
(Mich.) (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.theoaklandpress.com/article/OP/20130125/NEWS/
301259967 [https://perma.cc/3VZ8-57P4]; Steve Neavling, FBI: Highland Park Cops Beat
and Rob Man, Then Deal Cocaine for Him, Motor City Muckraker (Jan. 25, 2013), http://
motorcitymuckraker.com/2013/01/25/fbi-highland-park-cops-beat-and-rob-man-then-deal-
cocaine-for-him [https://perma.cc/79V7-LHH4].
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By allowing mug shots to be withheld on privacy grounds, the Sixth
Circuit essentially contends that the way a person looks or appears in a
mug shot is somehow more damning and harmful than the printed fact
that the person was arrested. Put differently, the court intimates that
making public an individual’s image is more embarrassing than the objec-
tive fact of the individual’s arrest being made public.
The harms of embarrassment and humiliation, however, would seem to
be found in the publication of the fact of an arrest, not the arrestee’s
appearance. It likely is the very unflattering fact that a person has been
arrested—not an unflattering appearance in a photo—from which the
harm flows. The Sixth Circuit, however, seeks to legally decouple the fact
of an arrest from an image taken subsequent to it and, in turn, to restrict
access to the latter in what amounts to protecting the vanity of the arres-
tee. A mug shot, at bottom, is not a glamour shot, and both arrestees and
those who view them should have no reasonable expectation that mug
shots capture people at their visual best. Yet the Sixth Circuit seemed to
be disturbed by that reality, and it thus chose to recognize a privacy inter-
est because mug shots are “snapped ‘in the vulnerable and embarrassing
moments immediately after [an individual is] accused, taken into custody,
and deprived of most liberties.’”253
Critically, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it evident that when the
government claims a particular form of content must be censored due to
the supposed injury that it produces, the government must proffer evi-
dence of “a direct causal link”254 between the speech and the harm in
question. In Detroit Free Press II, the USMS seeks to censor images of
mug shots (the particular form of content) because of the harms of em-
barrassment and humiliation that their publication might produce.255 Yet
the Sixth Circuit considered no evidence demonstrating such a direct
causal link, while—compounding the problem of causation—the critical
question of whether those harms actually stem from the fact of arrest,
rather than an image of the arrestee, plainly clouds the causal connection
and was left unaddressed by the appellate court.
Beyond the alleged mental harms of embarrassment and humiliation
springing from mug shots, the Sixth Circuit majority also was concerned
about possible fiscal injury. Specifically, the majority reasoned that a mug
shot could hamper “the depicted individual’s professional”256 prospects
because “potential employers”257 are able to “easily access booking
photos on these [mug-shot] websites.”258
Although holding superficial appeal, this justification is rendered futile
because any employer seriously concerned about the possible criminal
253. Detroit Free Press II, 829 F.3d at 482 (quoting Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126576, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2009)).
254. Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
255. Detroit Free Press II, 829 F.3d at 482.
256. Id. at 483.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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history of a prospective employee does not need to randomly review
mug-shot websites but will instead conduct actual criminal-background
checks through reputable services accredited by the National Association
of Professional Background Screeners.259 This is perfectly legal. As the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provides today on its
website:
some employers might try to find out about the person’s work his-
tory, education, criminal record, financial history, medical history, or
use of social media. Except for certain restrictions related to medical
and genetic information (see below), it’s not illegal for an employer
to ask questions about an applicant’s or employee’s background, or to
require a background check.260
In brief, any employer genuinely concerned about a potential em-
ployee’s brushes with the criminal justice system has a clear right to con-
duct in-depth searches, not just a superficial scouring of mug-shot
websites. Shielding mug shots in the name of stopping potential employ-
ers from knowing about an arrest thus is futile and the slenderest of reeds
against which to lean a justification for privacy and censorship.
One might, however, reasonably wonder about an employer who finds
a mug shot on the Internet of an individual who was arrested but never
convicted and, in turn, had the matter expunged.261 Indeed, a recent arti-
cle notes that “[m]ost states . . . allow for the expungement of arrest and
court records relating to cases that did not end in convictions.”262 An-
other article points out that expungement “commonly removes noncon-
viction records.”263 The impact of expungement in some states, such as
Illinois, is that an employer cannot “use the fact of an arrest or criminal
history record information” in a hiring decision.264
This argument, however, is rendered largely meaningless in FOIA Ex-
emption 7(C) cases such as Detroit Free Press II because “[t]here is no
general federal expungement statute.”265 Federal courts may only ex-
punge arrest records, invoking equitable discretion and ancillary jurisdic-
259. See About NAPBS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
SCREENERS, https://www.napbs.com/about-us/about-napbs/ [https://perma.cc/UXM9-
ZPFV] (describing NAPBS as a non-profit trade association that “was established to re-
present the interest of companies offering employment and tenant background screening
services. Just as importantly, however, the initial members wanted to establish and pro-
mote a high level of ethics and performance standards for the screening industry.”).
260. Background Checks: What Employers Need to Know, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (emphasis added), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/
background_checks_employers.cfm [https://perma.cc/XA8H-JSVU].
261. Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, The Myth of Arrestee DNA Expungement, 164 U. Pa. L.
Rev. Online 51, 53 (2015) (describing expungement as “a legal process that restores an
arrested person to the legal status she held prior to arrest”).
262. Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 353, 356 (2014).
263. Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Ap-
proach, 87 Temp. L. Rev. 403, 409 (2015).
264. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-103 (2016).
265. Erickson v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (D. Ore. 2010); see Fruqan
Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U.
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tion, in “extreme circumstances,”266 such as where “the sole purpose of
the arrests was to harass civil rights workers.”267 What is more, as one
federal court recently observed, “[d]ifficulty in obtaining or maintaining
employment because of a criminal record has been held insufficient to
warrant expungement.”268 This effectively eviscerates the expungement
argument when it comes to protecting federal agency records, including
the mug shots at issue in Detroit Free Press II.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a 2016 article marking the fiftieth anniversary of the federal Free-
dom of Information Act, Professors Chip Stewart and Charles Davis as-
sert that, over the course of fifty years, FOIA has “become a tool for
preserving secrecy rather than transparency.”269 Specifically, the duo em-
phasizes that “expansion of exemptions in the name of privacy over trans-
parency has effectively undermined the purpose of FOIA as a disclosure
statute.”270
There is little doubt, as this article illustrates, that the Sixth Circuit’s
2016 decision in Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice fits
snuggly within this trend and provides a somewhat sorrowful coda to a
half-century of anti-access FOIA decisions. Additionally, the opinion
comports with what Professor Derigan Silver recently contends is the
worry “that privacy concerns are keeping FOIA officials from releasing
information to journalists that would be valuable in writing stories.”271
As noted earlier, photographs—including mug shots—serve important
functions in journalism storytelling.272
Indubitably, the Internet makes massive amounts of information of all
varieties—mug shots included—readily, cheaply, and permanently acces-
sible. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Detroit Free Press II, however, unfor-
tunately indicates judicial willingness to stretch the interpretation of
FOIA Exemption 7(C) to counteract and neutralize, in the name of pri-
vacy, such simplicity and ease of access. Must there be, however, such a
positive correlation—as the Internet expands access to information, must
the scope and reach of FOIA Exemption 7(C) necessarily expand along
with it? The answer should be no.
As this article demonstrates, the practical obscurity rationale regarding
aggregated information, such as rap sheets, that proved pivotal in the Su-
Mem. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2008) (observing that “no federal statute expressly authorizes and
outlines the boundaries and contours of federal expungement”).
266. United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 540 (2d Cir. 1977).
267. Id.
268. Joefield v. United States, No. 13-MC-367, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109514, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasis added).
269. Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing Back Full Disclosure: A
Call for Dismantling FOIA, 21 Comm. L & Pol’y 515, 517 (2016).
270. Id. at 528.
271. Derigan Silver, The News Media and the FOIA, 21 Comm. L & Pol’y 493, 510
(2016).
272. Supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
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preme Court’s Reporters Committee decision simply is absent when it
comes to a mug shot.273 Similarly, as the article explains, the contents of a
mug shot are far different from the gruesome qualities of death-scene
images that propelled the Court in Favish.274
This article also argues, by analyzing a realistic hypothetical involving
the police officers whose mug shots are at issue in Detroit Free Press II,
that tort law would not provide a remedy for the public dissemination of
mug shots under either the theory of public disclosure of private facts or
intentional infliction of emotional distress.275 There is, then, a gaping
chasm between tort law and judicial interpretation of FOIA Exemption
7(C) when it comes to privacy interests. As noted earlier,276 University of
Chicago Professor Lior Jacob Strahilevitz maintains that following “well-
established privacy tort principles”277 provides a smooth path forward for
evaluating privacy interests under FOIA.
In the immediate aftermath of the Sixth Circuit’s 2016 ruling in Detroit
Free Press II, journalist James Eli Shiffer observed that while “[t]he mug
shot is the star of the voyeur’s [I]nternet,”278 making the images secret “is
worse.”279 That is because, as Shiffer wrote, mug shots “have the power
to inform and redress injustice, from clearing up mistaken identities to
shedding light on racial profiling.”280 And, as this article avers, finding a
privacy interest in mug shots that justifies keeping them secret because
some members of the public may not understand their meaning reeks of
judicial paternalism.281 Education is the remedy for public ignorance, not
censorship.
Furthermore, and assuming simply for the sake of argument that FOIA
is to be used to prohibit the dissemination of mug shots held by the
USMS and other government agencies, then that authority should come
directly from specific Congressional legislation. It should not arise from
judicial decisions like Detroit Free Press II that depend on the vagaries of
phrases such as “personal privacy” and “unwarranted invasion” used in a
general exemption and upon which the judges of the Sixth Circuit, sitting
en banc, closely divided by a nine-to-seven vote. Legislation, as this arti-
cle shows, already is starting to address concerns over the mug-shot web-
273. See supra Part I, Section A (addressing the Supreme Court’s decision in Reporters
Committee).
274. See supra Part I, Section B (addressing the Supreme Court’s decision in Favish).
275. See supra Part II (addressing hypothetical tort law claims).
276. See supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text (reviewing Strahilevitz’s
arguments).
277. Strahilevitz, supra note 155, at 2024.
278. James Eli Shiffer, Full Disclosure; What to Do with Booking Photos, Star Trib.
(Minneapolis, MN), July 24, 2016, at 2B.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See supra Part III, Section B (addressing the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that people
do not understand that individuals depicted in mug shots have not been convicted of crimi-
nal activity).
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sites that so bothered the Sixth Circuit.282 So too should any concerns
regarding the privacy of mug shots under FOIA be resolved by means of
pinpoint legislation, not via judicial decisions like Detroit Free Press II
that broadly affect all news organizations and media outlets.
Ultimately, this article offers multiple reasons why the Sixth Circuit
majority got it wrong in 2016 in Detroit Free Press II. The Internet should
not be used as a rationale—more cynically put, an easy excuse—for ex-
pansive judicial interpretations of FOIA Exemption 7(C). Tort law, in-
stead, provides a more logical and less technologically-centric approach
for weighing privacy interests in the Internet era. It is therefore regretta-
ble that the U.S. Supreme Court in May 2017 declined to consider the
Sixth Circuit’s ruling.
282. See supra notes 225 and 230 and accompanying text (addressing legislation target-
ing mug-shot websites, as well as actions by search engines and credit card companies af-
fecting such sites).
